November 17, 2025

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The principle that government must not interfere in “questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law” is deeply rooted in American law.”¹ Courts have operationalized this “non-interference principle” through the “church autonomy” or “ecclesiastical abstention” doctrine—different terms that all describe the same idea.² To protect against costly, unnecessary, and invasive litigation, churches should structure their operations to rely on this doctrine whenever applicable.  

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1. The Non-Interference Principle Explained

“First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when” litigation involving a church is “made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”³  So, “the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving” such disputes.⁴ In fact, the best defense to litigation for churches may be the application of a doctrine that holds “governmental intrusions into ecclesiastical questions are ‘impermissible.’”⁵ Absent proof of insincerity or fraud, a church’s decisions “‘on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive.’”⁶ Accordingly, churches should clarify in by-laws and other governance documents that all operational decisions—from staffing, to ministry priorities, to church discipline—are matters of faith and doctrine.  

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2. Application of the Non-Interference Principle

Much has been made of the so-called “ministerial exception”—an affirmative defense that precludes application of “laws governing the employment relationship between a religious institution and certain key employees.”⁷ You can learn more through Napa Legal’s resources on how the ministerial exception can protect the decisions of religious nonprofits when choosing leaders and other “ministers,” as well as review some updates based on recent caselaw.  

While the ministerial exception is important, church autonomy should extend beyond that issue. However, the exact bounds of church autonomy are unclear and, thus, often become the subject of litigation. A few recent cases provide insight on how the non-interference principle may be relevant to churches.  ‍

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a. Seeking Legal Benefits: New Life in Christ Church v. Fredericksburg

In 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a church’s certiorari petition for review after the State of Virginia denied a parsonage tax exemption (an exemption from tax for a religious minister’s housing allowance) because the State disagreed with the church on who qualified as a minister.⁸ Justice Gorsuch issued a stern dissent from the denial of certiorari to emphasize that the government has no business examining church doctrine concerning the validity of a religious belief—here, whether a couple overseeing the church’s college ministry were in fact “ministers” in the Presbyterian Church in America.⁹  

In this case, the State’s classification prevented the church from receiving a valuable tax exemption because the college ministry leaders lived in a church property that otherwise qualified as a parsonage home. But Justice Gorsuch’s statement should serve as a stern warning to courts that examine a church’s doctrines when evaluating whether that church (or minister) qualifies for a benefit. Relatedly, churches should emphasize that the titles and qualifications of different offices (including who is a “minister”) directly stem from the individual church’s interpretation of scripture and doctrine. That emphasis can help a church applying for a legal benefit to avoid being shut out on dubious grounds.   ‍

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b. Keeping Church Discipline Internal: Belya v. Kapral and McRaney v. N. Am. Mission Bd. Of the S. Baptist Convention

The Second Circuit held that “the church autonomy doctrine is a defense and not a jurisdictional bar from suit.”¹⁰ In this 2022 case, a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR) asserted defamation claims against other ROCOR officials and organizations, alleging that the defendants defamed him by publicly accusing him of forging letters related to his position.¹¹ Although the church framed the dispute as a matter of internal church discipline, the court ruled that it could apply “neutral principles of law” to “secular components of [the] dispute” in a way that “presents no infringement upon a religious association’s independence.”¹² This decision allowed the case to move forward and required the religious institutions to engage in costly and public litigation with a (now-departed) priest because the court did not believe that the institution’s actions following the disciplinary decision were sufficiently religious in nature.  

In contrast, the Fifth Circuit recently relied on the church autonomy doctrine to bar claims by a mission board’s former executive director against the organization. There, the court emphasized that “the church autonomy doctrine protects a church’s internal communications relating to church governance.”¹³ This protection foreclosed the director’s defamation claim, among others, because the organization’s termination decision was the culmination of “frank internal dialogue and deliberations.”¹⁴ On that score, “the church autonomy doctrine protect[s] ‘statements made in the context of a religious disciplinary proceeding when those statements are disseminated only to members of the church congregation or the organization's membership or hierarchy.’”¹⁵ By keeping disciplinary deliberations internal and making clear that “the genesis of the decision was doctrinal difference,” a church can avoid liability for harm that allegedly flows from those statements.  

As internal squabbles over church staffing, property disputes, and discipline bubble over into litigation, churches should make clear that all disciplinary decisions are a matter of religious belief and church doctrine. Indeed, whether to publicly chastise a church member or leader directly flows from a church body’s interpretation of scripture—including Matthew 18:15-18, which describes the fraternal correction process. Until the Supreme Court provides more definitive guidance on the church autonomy doctrine, churches must emphasize the ecclesiastical nature of church discipline and insist that the church’s response to disciplinary issues is likewise a church governance issue that is subject to God’s law over man’s. If a court agrees that a dispute is, at heart, an ecclesiastical matter, a church’s actions may be immune from suit on church autonomy grounds, sparing everyone involved the time and expense of litigation. Likewise, there is a big difference between sending a message rebuking a pastor to church members and sending the same email to the local news. The former is likely protected, while the latter may open the sender to exposure for defamation. It is therefore important for a church to document the nature of disciplinary proceedings, keep internal communications confined to the church body, and state clearly that all its responsive actions are guided by faith and scripture, rather than secular laws.  ‍

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c. Personnel is Policy: Fitzgerald v. Roncalli High School

Under the ministerial exception, the Seventh Circuit held that the First Amendment’s “ministerial exception” barred a former guidance counselor’s employment discrimination claim against a Catholic high school.¹⁶ Here, the court determined that a Catholic school was entitled to summary judgment after it terminated a guidance counselor for violating the school’s religious policy against “same-sex marriage.”¹⁷ While affirming the position that the counselor qualified as a “minister,”  Judge Michael Brennan wrote separately to emphasize that religious employers are exempt from Title VII employment discrimination claims as a matter of law even if the employee who filed suit does not qualify as a “minister.”¹⁸  

As the concurrence explained, when an employee is tasked with carrying on the activities of a “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society,” if the “employer demonstrates that an adverse employment decision was made because the relevant individual’s beliefs, observances, or practices did not conform with the employer’s religious expectations, the exemption would apply and bar a Title VII claim on that employment decision.”¹⁹ This distinction is critical because, as the concurrence observed, even though “the § 702(a) exemption overlaps with the protections of the ministerial exception” in this case, “no doubt, our circuit and its district courts will have occasion to address the statutory exemption in another case where a non-minister plaintiff asserts Title VII claims against a religious employer.”²⁰ Indeed, some courts may find that religious employers employ some staff members who do not qualify as “ministers”—e.g., without conceding the issue, perhaps a church secretary who does not actually speak with parishioners—yet those institutions can still avail themselves of the legal protections specifically designed to protect religious staffing decisions from judicial interference. It is therefore important for all churches to have clear religious policies regarding expected conduct and beliefs, while also maintaining employee handbooks and job descriptions that make clear every employee is tasked with carrying out the religious mission of the church. In doing so, churches can maximize their legal protections and autonomy in key operational processes.  ‍

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3. Conclusion

While the principles of non-interference and church autonomy continue to be debated by courts, religious organizations can draw some practical takeaways. A church’s legal documents (from bylaws to employee handbooks) should spell out the religious nature of all activities in which it engages. Through clear statements and policies that reference ecclesiastical texts, churches establish that their decisions are matters of faith and doctrine. And internal communications regarding governance and disciplinary proceedings should remain internal to church leadership or membership, rather than being shared outside the institution. Doing so will best position churches to qualify for conditional legal benefits that protect them from government interference in ecclesiastical affairs. 

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¹Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871).

²See, e.g., Belya v. Kapral, 45 F.4th 621, 628 n.4 (2d Cir. 2022) (using “the term ‘church autonomy doctrine’ to refer generally to the First Amendment’s prohibition of civil court interference in religious disputes,” while noting that others use “the term ‘ecclesiastical abstention’ to refer to the same concept”).

³Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).

⁴Id.

⁵Trustees of New Life in Christ Church v. Fredericksburg, 142 S. Ct. 678, 679 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (quoting Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 718–19 (1976)). 

⁶Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 729 (emphasis added).

⁷Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020); see also Kaytlin Roholt Lane, The Ministerial Exception: How Catholic Nonprofits Can Safeguard Their Right to Choose Their Own Leaders, Napa Legal (Aug. 5, 2020).

⁸Trustees of New Life in Christ Church, 142 S. Ct. at 679 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (explaining that, in Virginia, “a church may claim a ‘ministerial’ residence exempt from taxes (citing Va. Code Ann. § 58.1–3606(A)(2) (2017))). 

⁹Id. at 678–79.

¹⁰Belya, 45 F.4th at 633.

¹¹Id. at 625.

¹²Id. at 630.

¹³McRaney v. N. Am. Mission Bd. Of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 2025 WL 3012553, at *9 (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025) (emphasis added).

¹⁴Id.

¹⁵Id. (quoting Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered Augsburg Confession of Worthington, 877 N.W.2d 528, 542 (Minn. 2016)).

¹⁶Fitzgerald v. Roncalli High Sch., Inc., 2023 WL 4528081 (7th Cir. July 13, 2023)

¹⁷Id. at *1.

¹⁸Id. at *4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1(a)) (Brennan, J., concurring).

¹⁹Id. at *6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1(a)) (Brennan, J., concurring).

²⁰Id.